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Abstract
In this paper we present a new class of convolutional codes that admits an efficient al-
gebraic decoding algorithm. We study some of its properties and show that it can decode
interesting sequences of errors patterns. The second part of the paper is devoted to in-
vestigate its use in a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem. In contrast to the classical
McEliece cryptosystems, where block codes are used, we propose the use of a convolu-
tional encoder to be part of the public key. In this setting the message is a sequence of
messages instead of a single block message and the errors are added randomly throughout
the sequence. We conclude the paper providing some comments on the security. Although
there is no obvious security threats to this new scheme, we point out several possible
adaptations of existing attacks and discuss the difficulties of such attacks to succeed in
breaking this cryptosystem.
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1. Introduction
There are two classes of error detecting and correcting codes: block codes and convolu-
tional codes. Block codes divide the information in blocks of a given length and encode
them following always the same procedure whereas convolutional codes consider the in-
formation as a whole sequence. Despite the fact that convolutional codes are as important
for applications as block codes, their mathematical description is much less developed and
there exists only a few algebraic constructions of convolutional codes [1, 2, 11, 20, 23].
The achievement of an efficient decoding of convolutional codes under the appearance of
errors remains an open fundamental challenge. Maybe the most prominent decoding al-
gorithm is the one given by Viterbi, see also [10], which applies the principle of dynamic
programming to compute the transmitted sequence in a maximum likelihood fashion [7].
The main drawback of this algorithm is that its complexity increases exponentially with
the memory of the code and therefore it becomes computationally infeasible if the degree
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of the encoder is large. Others decoding procedures like the Massey’s threshold decoding
algorithm [17], list decoding [14, 24] or iterative methods [9, 13] have been implemented
and even some algebraic decoders have been proposed [22], but the problem of finding
more efficient decoding algorithms is very hard in full generality and contains the problem
of decoding linear block codes as a special case (known to be an NP-complete problem).
In this paper we present a class of convolutional codes that admit a simple iterative algeb-
raic decoding algorithm. The idea of the algorithm seems to be different from the above
ideas and is based on building a polynomial encoder as the product of a block code encoder
and two invertible Laurent polynomial matrices. Hence, the decoding is performed by in-
verting the polynomial matrices and decode the corrupted data using the block code. We
study this class of convolutional codes and show that the decoding procedure is efficient
when the errors are spread out along the received sequence. These features make them
good candidates to be applied to the McEliece Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC). In the
second part of the paper we study this possibility.
The McEliece PKC has received a lot of attention in recent years due to the fact that is one
of the most promising post quantum PKC, i.e., able to resist attacks based on quantum
computers. Lately, there has been a great interest in post quantum cryptography due
to the possibility of the appearance of quantum computers as they would break most of
the PKC used in practice, more concretely, all cryptosystems based on factorization and
discrete logarithm problems, such as RSA, ElGamal scheme, DSA or ECDSA. Another
important advantage of the McEliece cryptosystem is its fast encryption and decryption
procedures which require a significantly lower number of operations with respect to al-
ternative solutions (like RSA). However, the original McEliece cryptosystem has two main
disadvantages: low encryption rate and large key size, both due to the Goppa block codes
it is based on.
Motivated by this, there have been several attempts to substitute the underlying Goppa
codes by other classes of block codes, e.g., Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS), Low-Density
Parity-Check(LDPC), Quasi-Cyclic, among others. Unfortunately, these alternatives have
exposed the system to security threats. A new idea was recently presented in [4] where
Baldi et al. proposed to replace the permutation matrix used in the original McEliece
scheme by a more general transformation. This new variant aimed at opening the pos-
sibility of trying to use again different classes of codes (e.g.GRS) that were unsuccessfully
proposed earlier. Although modifications of this idea and different parameters are cur-
rently under investigation, the proposed system in [4] was broken in [6].
Within this thread of research, another interesting variant was recently proposed in [16]
(see also [19]) where the secret code is a convolutional code. One of the most appealing fea-
tures of this system is the fact that its secret generator matrix contains large parts which
are generated completely at random and has no algebraic structure as in other schemes
such as GRS, algebraic geometry codes, Goppa codes or Reed-Muller codes. Another im-
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portant property is that convolutional codes allow to deal with long sequence of data in a
sequential fashion which makes the computations of large data very efficient. However, the
authors already pointed out that this approach suffered from two main problems. The first
one being the above mentioned decoding problem, namely, that if one wants a maximum
likelihood decoding, such as the Viterbi decoding algorithm, the memory used must be
very limited. The second problem stems from the fact that convolutional codes usually
start from the all zero state, and therefore the first code symbols that are generated will
have low weight parity-checks, which would imply security threats. The scheme considered
in [16] processed just one fixed length block of data and therefore had many similarities
with block codes. This allowed the adaptation of existing attacks for block codes and the
scheme was finally broken by G. Landais and J-P. Tillich in [15].
In this paper we continue this line of work and further investigate the possibility of using
convolutional codes instead of block codes. In the proposed scheme the message is not a
block vector but a stream of vectors sent in a sequential fashion. Again the security relies
in the difficulty of decoding a general convolutional code (specially hard when the degree
of the code is large). Our construction uses large parts of randomly generated matrices in
order to mask the secret key and the truncated sliding matrices of the encoders are not full
row rank (i.e., they are not generator matrices of a block code). Therefore, the existing
attacks to this type of PKC do not seem to be effective. We nevertheless discuss the
difficulties of possible adaptations of known attacks to this new context. It is important
to mention that in this work we aim at providing the basic ideas and properties that a
convolutional code must have in order to be used in the McEliece cryptosystem. Many
important aspects such as setting up the proper parameters to achieve a certain designed
work factor or key size requires further investigation and is beyond the scope of the present
work.
2. A new class of Convolutional Codes
Let F = Fq be a finite field of size q, F((D)) be the field of formal Laurent series, F(D,D
−1)
be the ring of Laurent polynomials, F(D) is the field of rational polynomials and F[D] be
the ring of polynomials, all with coefficients in F. Notice that
F[D] ⊆ F(D,D−1) ⊆ F(D) ⊆ F((D)).
Unlike linear block codes, there exist several approaches to define convolutional codes.
Here we introduce convolutional codes using the generator matrix approach. As opposed
to block codes, convolutional codes process a continuous sequence of data instead of blocks
of fixed vectors. If we introduce a variable D, usually called the delay operator, to indicate
the time instant in which each information arrived or each codeword was transmitted,
then we can represent the sequence message (uλ,uλ+1, · · · ),ui ∈ F
k as a Laurent series
u(D,D−1) = uλD
λ + uλ+1D
λ+1 + · · · ∈ Fk((D)), for λ ∈ Z. In this representation the
encoding process of convolutional codes, and therefore the notions of convolutional code
3
and convolutional encoder, can be presented as follows.
A convolutional code C (see definition [18, Definition 2.3]) of rate k/n is an F((D))-subspace
of F((D))n of dimension k given by a rational encoder matrix G(D) ∈ Fk×n(D),
C = Im F((D))G(D) =
{
u(D,D−1)G(D) : u(D,D−1) ∈ Fk((D))
}
,
where u(D,D−1) =
∑
i≥λ uiD
i is called the information vector. If
G(D) =
m∑
i=0
GiD
i ∈ Fk×n[D]
is polynomial, m is called the memory of G(D), since it needs to “remember” the inputs
ui from m units in the past. Note that when m = 0 the encoder is constant and generates
a block code. Hence, the class of convolutional codes generalizes the class of linear block
codes in a natural way.
A dual description of a convolutional code C can be given through one of its parity-check
matrices which are (n− k)× n full rank rational matrices H(D) such that
C = kerF((D))H(D) =
{
v(D) ∈ Fn((D)) | H(D)v(D) = 0 ∈ Fn−k((D))
}
.
The ingredients for building up our class of convolutional codes are the following. Let
G ∈ Fk×n be an encoder of an (n, k)-block code that admits an efficient decoding algorithm,
T (D,D−1) =
µ∑
i=−µ
TiD
i ∈ Fn×n(D,D−1) (1)
an invertible (in F(D,D−1)) Laurent polynomial matrix such that
a) its determinant is in F;
b) the positions of the nonzero columns of Ti form a partition of n;
c) each row of Ti has at most one nonzero element, for i = −µ, . . . , 0, . . . , µ;
and
S(D) =
ν∑
i=µ
SiD
i ∈ Fk×k[D] (2)
with Sµ ∈ F
k×k an invertible constant matrix.
We propose to construct a convolutional encoder G′(D) as:
G′(D) = S(D) G T−1(D,D−1). (3)
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We shall prove that the encoder G′(D) is polynomial and therefore can be used as a
blueprint for building a physical encoder for the code, i.e., a device which can be used
to transform k parallel streams of information symbols into n parallel streams of coded
symbols. With the goal of developing an algebraic decoding algorithm for G′(D) we start
by analyzing the structure of the matrix T (D,D−1).
Lemma 2.1. The matrix T (D,D−1) is as described above if and only if it can be written
as
T (D,D−1) = Π∆(D,D−1) Γ,
where
1. Γ ∈ Fn×n is a permutation matrix;
2. ∆(D,D−1) ∈ Fn×n(D,D−1) is a diagonal Laurent polynomial matrix, whose entries
are powers of D ranging from D−µ to Dµ with increasing exponents along the diag-
onal, with di entries equal to D
i, for −µ ≤ i ≤ µ such that
µd−µ + · · ·+ 2d−2 + d−1 = d1 + 2d2 · · ·+ µdµ;
3. Π ∈ Fn×n is an invertible matrix with the following characteristics
Π =


Id−µ U1 2 . . . U1 2µ U1 2µ+1
U2 1 Id−µ+1 . . . U2 2µ U2 2µ+1
...
...
. . .
...
...
Uµ+1 1 . . . Id0 . . . Uµ+1 2µ+1
...
...
. . .
...
...
U2µ+1 1 U2µ+1 2 . . . U2µ+1 2µ Idµ


where each Ui j has at most one nonzero entry in each row.
Proof. Let T (D,D−1) =
∑µ
i=−µ TiD
i ∈ Fn×n(D,D−1) be a Laurent polynomial matrix
such that the positions of the nonzero columns of Ti form a partition of n and each row
of Ti has at most one nonzero element, for i = −µ, . . . , 0, . . . , µ. It follows that for each
column of T (D,D−1), its nonzero entries have equal exponents of D. Reorder its columns
so that the exponents of D are in increasing order along the columns (this corresponds to
multiply T on the right by a permutation matrix Γ′).
Consider the diagonal Laurent polynomial matrix ∆′(D,D−1) whose (i, i) entry isDj if the
nonzero elements of the column i of T (D,D−1) Γ′ are of the form aD−j, where a ∈ F and
−µ ≤ j ≤ µ. Then the matrix Π = T (D,D−1) Γ′∆′(D,D−1) satisfies the conditions of 3.
Therefore, T (D,D−1) = Π∆′(D,D−1)−1 (Γ′)T , and since the determinant of T (D,D−1) is
in F, (∆′(D,D−1))−1 satisfies condition 2. It is also easy to see that any matrix that is
the product of matrices satisfying the above conditions is of the form stated in (1) and
satisfies the conditions a), b) and c).
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Corollary 2.2. The inverse of T−1(D,D−1) is as follows:
P (D,D−1) = T−1(D,D−1) =
µ∑
i=−µ
PiD
i ∈ Fn×n(D,D−1),
where the positions of the nonzero rows of Pi form a partition of n. Consequently, G
′(D)
as in (3) is polynomial and has memory ≤ µ+ ν.
Proof. Suppose that T (D,D−1) = Π∆(D,D−1) Γ, then P (D,D−1) = ΓT∆(D,D−1)−1Π−1.
Clearly, for each row of ∆(D,D−1)−1Π−1 all nonzero entries have equal exponents of D
and when we multiply by the permutation matrix we only interchange the rows. Therefore,
the positions of the nonzero rows of Pi form a partition of n. The last statement follows
easily from previous considerations.
Let wt(v(D,D−1)) be the Hamming weight of a polynomial vector v(D,D−1) =
∑
i∈Z
viD
i,
defined as wt(v(D,D−1)) =
∑
i∈Z
wt(vi), being wt(vi) the number of the nonzero compon-
ents of vi ∈ F
n.
For the sake of simplicity we shall consider information vectors that start at time instant
zero and have finite support, i.e., u(D) ∈ Fk[D] is polynomial. We will also consider the
error vectors e(D) ∈ Fn[D] to be polynomial.
Lemma 2.3. Let T (D,D−1) be as described above and e(D) =
∑
i≥0
eiD
i ∈ Fn[D], a
random error vector satisfying
wt((ei, ei+1, . . . , ei+2µ)) ≤ t (4)
for all i ≥ 0. Then, all the coefficients of e(D)T (D,D−1) have weight less than or equal
to t.
Proof. It readily follows from the observation that if each row of Ti has at most one nonzero
element, then wt(ej) ≥ wt(ejTi) for all j ≥ 0 and −µ ≤ i ≤ µ. Take ej = 0 for j < 0,
then the s-th coefficient of e(D)T (D,D−1) is given by
µ∑
i=−µ
es−iTi, for s ≥ −µ, and the
result follows.
The condition in (4) describes the maximum number of errors allowed within a time
interval and is similar to the sliding window condition introduced in [3] to describe the
possible error patterns that can occur in a given channel.
Theorem 2.4. Let G′(D) be the encoder as described in (3), t the correcting error capab-
ility of G, u(D) the information sequence and e(D) an error vector satisfying (4). Then,
the received data y(D) = u(D)G′(D) + e(D) ∈ Fn[D] can be successfully decoded.
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Proof. Let y(D) = u(D)G′(D) + e(D) ∈ Fn[D] where u(D) = u0 + u1D + · · ·+ uℓD
ℓ is
an information sequence and e(D) = e0 + e1D + · · · + eℓ+µ+νD
ℓ+µ+ν is an error vector
satisfying (4).
Multiplying y(D) by T (D,D−1) from the right yields the polynomial equation
y(D)T (D,D−1) = u(D)S(D)G+ e(D)T (D,D−1).
Hence, each coefficient of this polynomial is of the form ûiG+ êi where
ν+ℓ∑
i=ν
ûiD
i = u(D)S(D)
and ∑
i≥−µ
êiD
i = e(D)T (D,D−1).
By Lemma 2.3 it follows that wt(ê) ≤ t and therefore each ûi can be recovered. Further,
one can retrieve u(D) from
u(D)S(D) =
ℓ+ν∑
i=µ
ûiD
i
as [
ûµ ûµ+1 · · · ûℓ+ν
]
=
=
[
u0 u1 · · · uℓ
]


Sµ Sµ+1 · · · Sν
Sµ Sµ+1 · · · Sν
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
Sµ · · · Sν
. . .
...
. . .
...
Sµ


,
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Struc(ℓ)∈F(ℓ+λ+1)k×(ℓ+λ+1)k
and the matrix Struc(ℓ) is invertible as Sµ is invertible.
If we denote ∑
i≥−µ
ŷiD
i = y(D)T (D,D−1),
then, at each time instant j, with j ≥ −µ, we compute each
ŷj =
µ∑
i=−µ
yj−iTi
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by performing at most 2µ+ 1 multiplications of vectors of size n by a matrix of order n,
then decode ŷi using the decoding algorithm corresponding to G to obtain ûj . Finally
we retrieve uj by performing at most 2µ + 1 multiplications of vectors of size n by a
matrix of order n and 2µ sums of vectors of order n. Recall that the complexity of each
vector-matrix product is O(n2), so the complexity of decoding is O(n2µ).
3. A new variant of the McEliece PKC based on convolutional codes
3.1. The original McEliece cryptosystem
Next we briefly recall the original McEliece PKC. Let G ∈ Fk×n be an encoder of an
(n, k)-block code C capable of correcting t errors, S ∈ Fk×k an invertible matrix and
P ∈ Fn×n a permutation matrix. In the classical McEliece cryptosystem G, S and P are
kept secret, but G′ = SGP and t are public. Bob publishes G′ and Alice encrypts the
cleartext message u ∈ Fk to produce v = uG′, chooses a random error e ∈ Fn with weight
wt(e) ≤ t and sends the ciphertext
y = v+ e = uG′ + e = uSGP + e.
The generator matrix G is selected in such a way that allows an easy decoding so that
when Bob receives the vector y, multiplies from the right by the inverse of P and recovers
uS by decoding (uS)G+eP−1 as wt(eP−1) ≤ t. Finally, Bob multiplies uS by the matrix
S−1 to obtain u.
It is important to recall that the security of this cryptosystem lies in the difficulty of
decoding a random encoder, known to be an NP hard problem. Hence, G needs to admit
an easy decoding algorithm but G′ has to look as random as possible.
3.2. A new variant using convolutional codes
Here we propose a new scheme of the McEliece PKC where a secret encoder of a block
code is masked by polynomial matrices yielding a polynomial encoder of a convolutional
code, which constitutes the public key. We shall consider the type of encoders described
in Section 2. In this context, the information vector u(D,D−1) represents the key to be
interchanged and thus will be a polynomial with designed fixed degree.
Let S(D), G, P (D,D−1) = T−1(D,D−1) and t be as in Section 2. The proposed scheme
works as follows:
Secret key: {S(D), G, P (D,D−1)}.
Public key: {G′(D) = S(D)GP (D,D−1), t}.
Encryption: Alice selects an error vector e(D) satisfying (4) and encrypts the message
u(D) = u0 + u1D + u2D
2 + · · ·+ uℓD
ℓ ∈ F[D]k as
y(D) = u(D)G′(D,D−1) + e(D). (5)
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Decryption: Bob multiplies (5) from the right by the matrix T (D,D−1) to obtain
u(D)S(D)G+ e(D)T (D,D−1), (6)
decode using G and finally recover the message u(D) from u(D)S(D).
It is important to note that the scheme presented is possible due to Theorem 2.4 and
can be implemented sequentially, i.e., we can encrypt the data ui’s as it enters into the
encoder G′ and decrypt the sequence of yi’s as they arrive, without waiting for the end of
the transmission.
4. Comments on the security
In this section we outline possible attacks to the proposed cryptosystem and show how
the properties analyzed in Section 2 provide key security. As mentioned before a thor-
ough study of the security requires further investigation. The ideas presented here are
given in general terms and setting the right parameters to provide a desired work factor,
key size or an certain encryption/decryption complexity lies beyond the scope of the work.
There are two main classes of attacks to the McEliece cryptosystem. One, called structural
attacks, is based on specific techniques aiming at exploiting the particular structure of the
code. The other class, called Information Set Decoding (ISD), try to decode the ciphertext
in order to obtain the plaintext directly from the public key.
Each one of these classes will be analysed considering two different situations: One when
the attacker deals with the whole message and another when only truncated parts (inter-
vals) of the sequence that forms the message are considered. This is explained next.
The ciphertext is generated as y(D) = u(D)G′(D) + e(D) or equivalently,[
y0 y1 · · · yℓ · · · yℓ+ν+µ
]
(7)
is equal to the multiplication of [
u0 u1 · · · uℓ
]
(8)
with


G′0 G
′
1 · · · G
′
ν+µ
G′0 G
′
1 · · · G
′
ν+µ
. . .
. . .
. . .
G′0 G
′
1 · · · G
′
ν+µ
. . .
. . .
. . .
G′0 G
′
1 · · · G
′
ν+µ


(9)
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and adding the error vector [
e0 e1 · · · eℓ+ν+µ
]
. (10)
An attacker could consider the full row rank matrix in (9) as the generator matrix of a
block code. Note, however, that the size of this block code is k(ℓ+ 1)× n(ℓ+ 1 + ν + µ)
and therefore it will be very large for large values of ℓ and ν, even if n, k and µ are small.
Notice that to decode Bob uses just matrices of size k × n.
Another possibility is to consider an interval of the ciphertext sequence in (7) instead of
the whole sequence. However, convolutional codes have memory and therefore each yi
depends on previous data. In order to discover yi one needs to compute previous yj, i.e.,
one must estimate the state of the convolutional code at time instant i.
Thus, it seems natural to try to attack the first vectors [y0y1 · · ·ys] for different values of
s, as the initial state is assumed to be zero. Indeed, this possible weakness when using
convolutional codes in the McEliece cryptosystem was already pointed out in [16].
For these reasons we are particularly interested in the security of the following interval of
data
[
u0 u1 · · · us
]


G′0 G
′
1 · · · G
′
s
G′0 · · · G
′
s−1
. . .
...
G′0

+[ e0 e1 · · · es ] = [ y0 y1 · · · ys ] , ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:G′truc(s)
(11)
s ≤ ℓ and obviously Gi = 0 for i > ν + µ. In practice, block codes typically consider large
values of n and k whereas convolutional codes are used with small values of n and k and
the memory is tuned for the application at hand. Note that ℓ can be taken to be very
large without increasing the size of the public key nor the operations performed at each
time instant.
4.1. Structural attacks
One general observation about the security of the proposed cryptosystem is about the
way the public key is generated. As opposed to previous constructions of the variants of
the McEliece PKC, G′(D) = S(D)GP (D,D−1) is constructed using large parts randomly
generated, and this makes, a priori, structure attacks more difficult. Effectively, the coef-
ficients of S(D) are totally randomly generated except for the Sµ that is required to be
invertible. Moreover, we will show next that the set of admissible P (D,D−1) is consider-
ably large, and therefore P (D,D−1) also introduces additional randomness into the system.
Lemma 4.1. The number of possible S(D) is equal to
(ν − µ)qk
2
k−1∏
j=0
(qk − qj).
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Proof. Since Sµ is invertible there are
∏k−1
j=0(q
k − qj) possibilities for Sµ. There is no
restriction for Si with µ < i ≤ ν, so there are q
k2 possibilities for each Si.
To estimate the cardinality of the set of possible T (D,D−1) in our cryptosystem recall
that we may take T (D,D−1) = Π∆(D,D−1) Γ, where Γ is any permutation matrix of
order n,
∆(D,D−1) =


1/Dµ
. . .
1/Dµ
. . .
1
. . .
1
. . .
Dµ
. . .
Dµ


︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−µ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
d0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dµ
where µd−µ + · · ·+ 2d−2 + d−1 = d1 + 2d2 · · ·+ µdµ, and
Π =


Id−µ U1 2 . . . U1 2µ U1 2µ+1
U2 1 Id−µ+1 . . . U2 2µ U2 2µ+1
...
...
. . .
...
...
Uµ+1 1 . . . Id0 . . . Uµ+12µ+1
...
...
. . .
...
...
U2µ+1 1 U2µ+1 2 . . . U2µ+1 2µ Idµ


where each Ui j has at most one nonzero entry in each row. If i > j, the matrices Ui j
should be chosen so that Π is invertible and each row has at most one nonzero element.
The simplest case is when they are all null matrices. In this case, there are
(q − 1)(dj−µ−1 + 1)
di−µ−1
possible Ui j matrices, when i < j. There are also n! possible Γ matrices.
Lemma 4.2. The number of possible ∆(D,D−1) matrices such that ∆(D,D−1) 6= In, is
µ⌊n/2⌋∑
r=1
min(r,n)∑
i=1
p(r, i, µ)

min(r,n−i)∑
j=1
p(r, j, µ)


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where p(r, i, µ) is the number of partitions of r into exactly i parts and in which the largest
part has size at most µ.
Proof. The number of possible ∆(D,D−1) matrices is equal to the number of 2µ+1-tuples
(d−µ, . . . , d0, . . . , dµ) such that d−µ + · · ·+ d0 + · · ·+ dµ = n and
µd−µ + · · ·+ 2d−2 + d−1 = d1 + 2d2 · · ·+ µdµ.
First notice that, if µd−µ + · · · + 2d−2 + d−1 = 0 then d0 = n and ∆(D,D
−1) = In and
that under those two conditions, we cannot have µd−µ + · · ·+ 2d−2 + d−1 > µ⌊n/2⌋.
Let 0 ≤ r ≤ µ⌊n/2⌋. The number of µ-tuples (d−µ, . . . , d1) such that µd−µ+ · · ·+ d−1 = r
is equal to
min(r,n)∑
i=1
p(r, i, µ),
where p(r, i, µ) is the number of such µ-tuples with d−µ+· · ·+d−1 = i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ min(r, n).
But if d−µ + · · ·+ d−1 = i, then d1 + · · · , dµ ≤ n − i. In order to obtain a 2µ + 1-tuples
(d−µ, . . . , d0, . . . , dµ) we also need that d1+2d2 · · ·+µdµ = r, hence the result follows.
Note that the partitions p(r, i, µ) can be computed by recurrence [12]. Next we look at
possible structural attacks to the truncated sliding generator matrix G′trunc(s). Recall that
u(D)S(D) =
∑ν+ℓ
i=µ ûiD
i. Equation (11) can be written as
[
ûµ ûµ+1 · · · ûµ+s
]


G
G
. . .
...
G




P−µ · · · P0 · · · Pµ
P−µ · · · P0 · · · Pµ
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . Pµ
. . .
. . .
. . . P0
. . .
P−µ


(12)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Ptruc(s)
As all the matrices in the equation (12) are constant, then it may seem to describe a
similar situation as the original McEliece PKC using block codes. Note, however, that
Ptruc(s) is neither a permutation nor an invertible matrix. The idea of using more general
transformations rather than permutations was recently investigated in [4]. This scheme
was broken in [6] using a structural attack based on the notion of square code construction.
The matrices Ptruc(s) are not invertible which make the attack in [6] inefficient in this case.
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4.2. Plaintext recovery
These attacks try to decode a random linear code without requiring any knowledge of
the secret key. However, trying to decode directly a convolutional code using ML de-
coding, e.g., the Viterbi decoding algorithm, seems very difficult as the complexity grows
exponentially with the memory of the code.
The plaintext recovery type of attack is typically performed using information set decoding
algorithms (ISD). Information set decoding tries to solve the following NP-hard problem:
Given a random looking generator matrix G′ ∈ Fk×n of a linear code C ′ and a vector
y = uG′ + e, recover u. Roughly speaking, the problem is that of decoding a random
linear code. The first step of any ISD algorithm is to find a size-k index set I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}
such that the sub-matrix of G′ with the columns indexed by I forms an invertible matrix
of order k, or, equivalently, the sub-matrix of the parity check matrix H ′ (associated with
G′) with the columns indexed by I⋆ = {1, 2, . . . , n} \ I forms an invertible matrix of order
n− k. The set I is called an Information Set.
The second step depends of the algorithm we are using, but the basic idea is to guess the
I-indexed part eI of the error vector e according to a predefined method (that depends
on each specific algorithm) and try to obtain the whole e from these assumptions. For
example:
• In Prange algorithm (also called plain ISD algorithm) we guess that wt(eI) = 0.
• In Lee-Brickell algorithm we guess that wt(eI) = p, for a fixed value p.
• In Stern algorithm we separate I in two sets I1 and I2 with approximately the
same size and guess that wt(eI1) = p/2, wt(eI2) = p/2, and so wt(eI) = p. Stern
considers also another restrition in the I⋆-indexed part of e, namely that the first m
coordinates have zero weight.
Next, we analyse how these ideas could be adapted to our context. Consider the full row
rank matrix in (9) and ISD attacks using, for instance, the Stern algorithm (or some of
its more improved versions [21, 8, 5]). The probability of success is
(
k(ℓ + 1)/2
p/2
)2(
n(ℓ+ µ+ ν + 1)− k(ℓ+ 1)−m
t− p
)
(
n(ℓ + µ+ ν + 1)
t
)
and the search time is
(
k(ℓ+ 1)/2
p/2
)
pm[
(
k(ℓ+ 1)/2
p/2
)2
2m
(p(n(ℓ+ µ+ ν + 1)− k(ℓ+ 1)−m) +O(1)).
As these values depend on ℓ if one chooses a large enough ℓ the work factor will achieve
a certain designed value. If one considers an interval as in (11) the problem is that this
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is not an standard decoding problem as G′truc(s) is not a full row rank matrix. One can
try to adapt the ISD algorithms to this situation. One way to do it is instead of starting
with size-k information sets, we look for smaller sets (that will depend on the number of
nonzero rows each Pi has).
Let denote ks = rank (G
′
truc(s)) and select a size-ks information set I = {a1, . . . , aks} ⊂
{1, . . . , k(s+ 1)} and let ts be the maximum number of errors that the code can tolerate
within the time interval [a1, . . . , aks]. Let P (k, n, t) be the probability of determining the
secret message when using a (n, k)-block code with error-correcting capability t in the
classical McEliece PKC. Then, it follows that the probability of recovering û in (11) is
1
qk(s+1)−ks
P (ks, n(s+ 1), ts).
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